The Secrets of Foreign Bankers and the Federal Investigation: Tottering Balances by O\u27Donnell, John L., Jr.
Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law
Volume 20 | Issue 2
1988
The Secrets of Foreign Bankers and the Federal
Investigation: Tottering Balances
John L. O'Donnell Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
John L. O'Donnell Jr., The Secrets of Foreign Bankers and the Federal Investigation: Tottering Balances, 20 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 509
(1988)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol20/iss2/5
The Secrets of Foreign Bankers and the Federal Investigation:
Tottering Balances
John L. O'Donnell, Jr.*
Bank secrecy laws of foreign countries are periodically thrust into na-tional headlines in the United States.1 In the 1970s, the U.S. Internal
Revenue Service's "Project Haven" focused national attention on the use
of Caribbean banks for anonymous deposits.2 Recently, secret bank ac-
counts returned to the headlines in connection with the Congressional
hearings on dealings with Iran and Nicaraguan Contras.3
Bank secrecy is not part of American jurisprudence,4 nor is it con-
sidered part of the "right of privacy"' protected by the Constitution.
The concept of privacy in one's financial matters is so foreign to Ameri"
can courts that one court of appeals has referred to the Swiss govern-
ment, popularly identified with bank secrecy laws, as "notorious for
protecting the privacy of financial transactions." 6
Whenever federal investigations lead to the doors of foreign banks,
or even U.S. banks doing business abroad, conflicts arise between the
investigator's need for information in the United States and the foreign
banker's obligations under foreign law. There are several precedents
from the courts of appeals,7 but surprisingly, none from the U.S.
* The author is a member of the firm of DeWolf, Ward & Morris, P.A., in Orlando, Florida.
He received his B.A. from the University of Toronto and his J.D., with honors, from the University
of Florida. Mr. O'Donnell was co-counsel for Anthony Field in United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
1 See, e.g., United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) and United States v. Baskes 433 F.
Supp. 799 (N.D. Ill. 1977), discussing the publicity surrounding the Project Haven and Operation
Tradewinds investigations, which concerned the use of Caribbean offshore banks, in the mid-1970s.
The publicity surrounding the recent "Iran-Contra" hearings was extensive. For one brief sample
which includes a synopsis of the affair, see Iran-Contra Panels Find Fault, But Not in the System,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1987, § 4, at 4 [hereinafter Iran-Contra Panels Find Fault].
2 See Payner, 447 U.S. at 727; Baskes, 433 F. Supp. at 799.
3 See Iran-Contra Panels Find Fault, supra note 1, at 4.
4 See, e.g., California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974); United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 21 (1976); Payner, 447 U.S. at 727; United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F. 2d 897 (2d
Cir. 1962) [hereinafter Citibank II1] (in which one of the depositors in the American-owned foreign
bank was itself an American corporation).
5 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
6 Field, 532 F. 2d at 408 (emphasis added).
7 Eg., First Nat'l City Bank v. I.R.S., 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959) [hereinafter Cititbank 1];
Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962); Citibank III, 396 F.2d 897;
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Supreme Court dealing with the recurring and substantial questions these
cases raise.
The privacy of financial transactions is much more respected in
other nations than in the United States. A report from the House Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency' is frequently cited9 for its view of bank
secrecy laws:
Secret foreign bank accounts and secret foreign institutions have
permitted a proliferation of "white collar" crimes; have served as a
financial underpinning of organized criminal operation in the United
States; have been utilized by Americans to evade income taxes, conceal
assets illegally and purchase gold [sic]; have allowed Americans and
others to avoid the law and regulations governing securities and ex-
changes; have served as an essential ingredient in frauds including
schemes to defraud the United States; have served as an ultimate de-
pository of black market proceeds from Vietnam; have served as a
source of questionable financing for conglomerate and other corporate
stock acquisitions mergers and takeovers; have covered conspiracy to
steal from the U.S. defense and foreign aid funds; and have served as a
cleansing agent for "hot" or illegally obtained monies....
The debilitating effects of the use of these secret institutions on
Americans and the American economy are vast. It has been estimated
that hundreds of millions in tax revenues have been lost.10
While forbidden gold ownership and Vietnam are no longer with us,
nearly all other elements of this index of crime and greed are in the head-
lines today."
Confronted with different political philosophies providing greater
respect for privacy in financial dealings, U.S. courts have exhibited every-
thing from disdain 2 to deference. 3 Different courts have reached differ-
Field, 532 F.2d at 404; United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir.), modified 691 F.2d
1281 (9th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981); United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691
F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1986) [hereinafter Bank of Nova Scotia 1];
United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1106
(1985) [hereinafter Bank of Nova Scotia 11]; In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied
sub nom, Roe v. United States, 108 S.Ct. 451 (1987).
8 H.R. REP. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AnMIN.
NEws 4394 [hereinafter HousE REPORT].
9 See, eg., California Bankers Ass'n, 416 U.S. at 21; Field, 532 F.2d at 404.
10 HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at 4397.
11 The use of foreign bank accounts to launder illegal drug money is currently being aggres-
sively pursued by The Department of Justice. See In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 494; Bank of Nova
Scotia II, 740 F.2d at 817. Illegal diversion of defense funds is one of the issues which surfaced in
the "Iran-Contra" hearings. See Iran-Contra Panels Find Fault, supra note 1, at 4. A criminal
antitrust investigation was the focus of the grand jury in Citibank III, 396 F.2d at 897. Tax evasion,
of course, is always with us. See, eg., Citibank I, 271 F.2d at 616; Field, 532 F.2d at 404.
12 See, eg., Field 532 F.2d at 404, Bank of Nova Scotia 1, 691 F.2d at 1384, Bank of Nova
Scotia II, 740 F.2d at 817.
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ent conclusions with respect to the protection given those who refuse to
disclose.14 Occasionally, the courts reach conclusions in cases involving
financial transactions which seem diametrically opposed to now well-set-
tled principles of American jurisprudence, elevating protection of princi-
ple over prosecution.' For example, the court in United States v. Field
("Field")16 was able to conclude:
We regret that our decision requires Mr. Field to violate the legal
commands of the Cayman Islands, his country of residence.... Yet,
this court simply cannot acquiesce in the proposition that United
States criminal investigations must be thwarted whenever there is con-
ffict with the interests of other states. 7
In the context of entirely domestic prosecutions, such a ruling, sanc-
tioning a government investigation in violation of law, would be uncon-
scionable.'" The heart of our constitutionally circumscribed criminal
procedures is that, in spite of society's overwhelming interest in ferreting
out and prosecuting criminal behavior, individual investigations must
give way to protection of higher principles.'
Why the difference and what does it mean to foreign bankers faced
with an order from a court of the United States to provide evidence con-
trary to the laws of their own countries? The answers are found in the
balancing of interests which teeter back and forth in judicial opinions
addressing the issue. The outcome of each case depends upon the nature
of the secrecy law involved, the request being made, and even the identity
of the institution or individual. The answers involve issues of not only
criminal law but foreign policy as well. So far, the answers to individual
cases have been neither uniform, nor, in some cases, satisfying.
I. REASONS FOR CONFLICT
The United States has an overwhelming interest in the enforcement
13 See, eg., Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d at 611; In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d
at 494.
14 Compare Field, 532 F.2d at 404 [and] Bank of Nova Scotia I, 69 F.2d at 1384 [and] Bank of
Nova Scotia I, 740 F.2d at 817 with Citibank I, 271 F.2d at 616 [and] Application of Chase Manhat-
tan Bank, 297 F.2d at 611 [and] In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 494.
15 See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (privileges recognize transcendent
public good); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (right to remain free from unlawful searches and
seizure no longer an empty promise); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) (stating that
"effective administration of criminal justice hardly requires disregard of fair procedures imposed by
law").
16 532 F.2d 404.
17 Id. at 410.
18 See McNabb, 318 U.S. at 332; Mapp, 367 U.S. at 643. But see Payner, 447 U.S. at 727.
19 See McNabb, 318 U.S. at 332; Mapp, 367 U.S. at 643.
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of its criminal laws, 20 and the ability of prosecutors to uncover evidence
of criminal conduct, particularly through grand jury proceedings, is es-
sential to the enforcement effort.21 Whether popular or not,2 2 the laws
criminalizing specific conduct reflect the judgment of a representative
legislature that the conduct is inimical to the very fabric of society."3
The range of illegal activity benefiting from secrecy laws is well docu-
mented in the report of the House Committee. 4
Nonetheless, the bank secrecy laws of other nations also reflect the
judgments of other representative legislatures that disclosure of financial
information is inimical to their societies.25 Foreign governments have
filed amici curiae briefs in support of their sovereign right to prohibit
disclosure contrary to their laws,26 which are generally criminal stat-
utes,2 7 or have applied to the executive department, which is the prose-
cuting authority, 8 to protest sanctions imposed for compliance with
their laws.29
Bank secrecy laws provide shelter for both legal and illegal activities
which people prefer to shield from public scrutiny. As with most things,
it was perhaps only a matter of time before the unscrupulous saw the
illegal gains available from secreting assets abroad.30
20 See, e-g., Field, 532 F.2d at 424; Bank of Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1384; Bank of Nova
Scotia II, 740 F.2d at 817.
21 See Field, 532 F.2d at 404; Bank of Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1384; Bank of Nova Scotia II,
740 F.2d at 817.
22 Many of the criminal laws cited in the HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8-antitrust, tax, securi-
ties, and gold ownership (at the time illegal)-are frequently viewed as "merely" economic regula-
tion and as such are occasionally viewed with less dignity than those statutes dealing with malum in
se topics like murder. See Field, 532 F.2d at 404; Vetco, 644 F.2d at 1324.
23 See Citibank II1, 396 F.2d 897. The Second Circuit declared, "These [antitrust] laws have
long been considered cornerstones of this nation's economic policies, have been vigorously enforced
and the subject of frequent interpretation by our Supreme Court." Id. at 903.
24 HoUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 4404.
25 The foreign states most frequently involved in bank secrecy are Switzerland, the Bahamas,
and the Cayman Islands. Each country has a representative government. See id. at 4404.
26 See, eg., Bank of Nova Scotia I1, 740 F.2d at 817.
27 See, e.g., Field, 532 F.2d at 404; Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d at 611. But
see Citibank II, 396 F.2d at 897 (involving questions of civil liability under German law). In Ci-
tibank III, the court noted the possibility that non-criminal penalties, such as charter revocation,
could be as compelling as criminal penalties. Id. at 902.
28 See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 494.
29 See id. Some courts have cited the fact that the executive department is seeking enforcement
of disclosure orders over foreign objection, in support of decisions minimizing any foreign policy
impact of compelled disclosure. See, eg., Citibank III, 396 F.2d at 904; Vetco, 691 F.2d at 1289 n.9,
Bank of Nova Scotia II, 740 F.2d at 823 n. 23. In United States v. First National City Bank, 379
U.S. 378, 384 (1965) [hereinafter Citibank II], the Supreme Court made similar comments. Citibank
11 involved "attachment" of a foreign account, rather than disclosure of foreign information.
30 In the United States this metamorphosis is generally seen in the use of the tax laws. A
deduction or exclusion intended to promote particular economic activity becomes a "loophole" and
then is pushed beyond its limits to become evasion. It is this very activity which frequently gives rise
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The dilemma is clear: courts committed to the rule of law must or-
der acts in violation of foreign law, or thwart enforcement of domestic
law, effectively surrendering sovereignty to the foreign nation." Inordi-
nate deference to foreign law would be an invitation to expanded nefari-
ous use of foreign banks, resulting in a hemorrhage of revenue,32 or a
haven for the profits of illegal activities33 which could either conceal
criminal conduct or make the possibility of detection and punishment
worth the risk. Obdurate insensitivity to the laws of foreign sovereigns,
and the difficult situation in which the bankers in the middle34 find them-
selves, would give rise to charges of arrogance35 and scorn for solemn
pronouncements on the sanctity of the "rule of law."36
Inevitably, these competing interests collided in the late 1950s when
the U.S. government began37 to seek information located in foreign
banks. The initial efforts were directed at U.S. banking institutions with
foreign branches.3" After some success in obtaining disclosure in those
circumstances,39 foreign banks with branches in the United States4' and
officers of foreign banks visiting in the United States4 ' became targets of
subpoenas to provide information, the disclosure of which is a criminal
act in their country of operations or residence.42
The basic conflict has come before the courts in a variety of investi-
gations,43 against a patchwork of foreign laws,' involving a cross-section
to an investigation resulting in the conflict between foreign secrecy laws and federal criminal investi-
gations. See, eg., Vetco, 691 F.2d at 1324.
31 See In re Sealed Case, 824 F.2d at 494; Field, 532 F.2d at 404; Bank of Nova Scotia I1, 740
F.2d at 817.
32 See HousE REPORT, supra note 8, at 4397-8.
33 See Bank of Nova Scotia I, 740 F.2d at 827-8 (discussing the use of offshore banks in con-
nection with the narcotics trade, and citing the foreign appellate court's view that such use was not
the intent of the laws of the foreign nation). See infra note 264.
34 Rarely are the bankers themselves the target of the investigation. Normally, they are only
the "stakeholder" of the information sought by the investigation. See, eg., Bank of Nova Scotia 1,
691 F.2d at 1388; In re Sealed Case, 824 F.2d at 494.
35 See Bank of Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1388.
36 Cf. In re Sealed Case, 824 F.2d at 494.
37 The decision in Citibank Iin 1959 was apparently the seminal case in which federal criminal
investigators sought disclosure of information in foreign banks protected by secrecy laws.
It is probably not coincidental that the beginning of these investigations corresponds with the
post-World War II era, in which the advances in telecommunications and travel made private inter-
national transactions much more feasible for Americans.
38 See Citibank 1, 271 F.2d at 616; Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d at 611;
Citibank II1, 396 F.2d at 897.
39 See Citibank 1, 271 F.2d at 616; Citibank 111, 396 F.2d at 897.
40 See Bank of Nova Scotia 1, 691 F.2d at 1384; Bank of Nova Scotia I, 740 F.2d at 817; In re
Sealed Case, 824 F.2d at 494.
41 See Field, 532 F.2d at 404; In re Sealed Case, 824 F.2d at 494.
42 See, eg., Field, 532 F.2d at 404; In re Sealed Case, 824 F.2d at 494.
43 See Citibank I, 271 F.2d at 616; Field, 532 F.2d at 404 (tax cases); Citibank III, 396 F.2d at
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of the banking community.4" The method by which these cases reach the
appellate courts is a primer in grand jury procedure.
II. ANATOMY OF CONFLICT
The conflict between investigator and banker begins when an inves-
tigation leads to the doors of a foreign bank and there is some basis for
jurisdiction over the bank to subject it to a summons46 or a grand jury
subpoena. 47
A. The Players
Obviously, American banking institutions are located in the United
States, but can documents maintained in their foreign branches, which
are subject to foreign secrecy laws, be reached through the American
parent institution? This was the first issue resolved by the courts dealing
with this conflict. In First National City Bank v. IRS ("Citibank i,),48
the Second Circuit ruled that the American parent bank had actual,
practical control over its Panamanian branch records and was required
to produce them.49 The court in Citibank I rejected the bank's argument
that 12 U.S.C. Section 60450 made its branch bank independent and
thereby negated any presumption of control over the branch's records.5
Thus, investigators crossed the first hurdle to obtaining access to secret
bank documents by establishing their right to require domestic banks to
bring those records to the United States.
More recently, foreign banks with branches or operations in the
897 (antitrust case); Bank of Nova Scotia I, 740 F.2d at 817 (narcotics case); In re Sealed Care, 824
F.2d at 494 (money laundering case).
44 Compare Citibank I, 271 F.2d at 616 (interpreting "competent authority" language) with
Citibank II1, 396 F.2d at 897 (bank secrecy in nature of privilege) [and] Vetco, 691 F.2d at 128
(court order provides defense) [and] Field, 532 F.2d at 404 (criminal penalties).
45 See, eg., Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d at 611 (U.S. bank); Bank of Nova
Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1384 (foreign bank); Field, 532 F.2d at 404 (individual).
46 Some of the cases involve summonses issued by the IRS pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7602
(1982). See Citibank 1, 271 F.2d at 616; Vetco, 644 F.2d at 1324. This article, though, will focus on
grand jury proceedings, discussing the summons procedure only incidentally.
47 Subpoenas to appear before a grand jury are governed by FED. R. CRiM. P. 17.
48 271 F.2d 616.
49 See id. at 618-19. The ruling was based upon the presumption that a corporation is in the
possession and control of its own books and records, and on the ability of the American bank to have
branch records sent to its home office.
5OEvery national banking association operating foreign branches shall conduct the ac-
counts of each foreign branch independently of the accounts of other foreign branches
established by it and of its home office, and shall at the end of each fiscal period transfer to
its general ledger the profit or loss accrued at each branch as a separate item.
12 U.S.C. § 604 (1982).
51 See Citibank 1, 271 F.2d at 618-19.
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United States have been the object of federal subpoenas.52 The courts
have concluded that they, too, are subject to subpoenas for records held
in foreign branches by virtue of their presence in the United States. 3
This conclusion appears a priori in the decisions, without any analysis of
the significant difference between the situation of foreign banks in the
United States and American banks with branches abroad.54
The difference is that the foreign bank offices in the United States
are themselves branches.5" The rationale in Citibank I was that the home
office had the power to require a branch to send its records and was
therefore presumed to have control over the records of the branch. Au-
thority for the opposite proposition-that a branch can require the home
office to forward records-is scant, however. 56 Nonetheless, foreign
banks with branches in the United States have faced the same compelled
disclosure as domestic institutions with branches abroad. 7
The final potential player in this conflict is the individual foreign
bank officer who is found in the United States, either for business5" or
pleasure.5 9 The officer, even without any documents, has been consid-
ered a valuable witness in at least two cases.6°
The non-resident alien bank official presents the most complex is-
52 See Bank of Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1384; Bank of Nova Scotia II, 740 F.2d at 817; In re
Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 494.
53 See, eg., Bank of Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1384. Even if not present in the United States,
alien corporations doing business in the United States are subject to subpoena powers. See In re
Grand Jury Subpoenas, 72 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). The possibility that an alien bank, not
present in the United States, may nonetheless be doing business in the United States and be subject
to a subpoena was argued by the government, but not decided, in Field, 532 F.2d at 404.
54 See, eg., Bank of Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1384; Bank of Nova Scotia II, 740 F.2d at 817;
In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 494.
55 See, eg., Bank of Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1384.
56 See Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960) (the control by an American branch of
documents held by the foreign parent was questioned, but not decided, because the subpoena was
modified to exclude production of the foreign documents); Bank of Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1384
(the issue was also raised in the district court, but was resolved against the bank without discussion
when the court of appeals affirmed the contempt order for the bank's failure to produce the foreign
records).
57 See Bank of Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1384; Bank of Nova Scotia II, 740 F.2d at 817.
58 See In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 494 (foreign bank officer was working in an American
branch of the bank when he was served with a grand jury subpoena).
59 See Field, 532 F.2d at 404 (foreign bank officer was served in the lobby of Miami Interna-
tional Airport).
60 In Field, 532 F. 2d at 404, the bank officer was asked questions such as: "Mr. Field, are
there any United States corporations managed by Castle Bank & Trust (Cayman) Ltd.?" and "To
the best of your knowledge, Sir, do any of the trusts which are managed by Castle (Cayman), do any
of these trusts manage any assets located in the United States; by assets I mean stocks, bonds, typical
assets including real property?" Appellant's Brief at 13, Field (No. 76-1739).
In In re Sealed Case, the court noted that by vacating the contempt order against the foreign
bank while sustaining the order against the individual banker, it left the grand jury with a potential
source for at least some of the information it sought. Id. at 499.
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sues in these cases,61 including the collateral issue of the manner in
which the U.S. government learned of his presence in the United States
in order to effect service.6z Oddly, this is the only issue arising in the
criminal investigations involving foreign secrecy laws to receive review in
the U.S. Supreme Court.63
The individual foreign bank official faces the most personal penal-
ties-jail in the United States for contempt or jail in the foreign country
for violating the secrecy law.' Yet, it is this witness who has received
the least consideration by the appellate courts.65
B. The Procedures
The conflict normally begins in these cases with a grand jury sub-
poena.66 These subpoenas are governed by Rule 17 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure.67
Except for nationals or residents of the United States,6 those indi-
61 The non-resident alien can raise questions not only about issues of international comity, but
also about issues of the scope of the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination. See infra
notes 70-73 and accompanying text. In Field, 532 F.2d at 404, the non-resident banker also raised
issues concerning the jurisdiction of the court to subpoena a non-resident alien under FED. R. CalM.
P. 17.
62 In Field, 532 F.2d at 404, Field, a foreign banker served in the Miami airport, argued that
permitting service on aliens in such cases would encourage invasion of expected privacy by wire tap,
mail interception or monitoring of ticketing information in order to determine when a non-resident
alien might be in the United States, in order to serve him with a subpoena. Field, 532 F.2d at 404.
63 See Payner, 447 U.S. at 727; see infra notes 83-91 and accompanying text.
64 See infra note 101 and accompanying text (concerning the penalties attached to bank secrecy
laws).
65 In the only two cases to directly consider claims by foreign bankers in bank secrecy cases,
the contempt citations were upheld. Field, 532 F.2d at 404; In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 494.
66 See, e.g., Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d at 611; Field, 532 F.2d at 404; In
re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 494. Occasionally, it is an IRS summons which initiates the conflict.
Eg., Citibank I, 271 F.2d at 616.
67 FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(e)-(g) provides:
Rule 17. Subpoena
(e) Place of Service
(1) In the United States. A subpoena requiring the attendance of a witness at a
hearing or trial may be served at any place within the United States.
(2) Abroad. A subpoena directed to a witness in a foreign country shall issue under
the circumstances and in the manner and be served as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1783.
(g) Contempt. Failure by any person without adequate excuse to obey a subpoena served
upon him may be deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena issued or of
the court for the district in which it issued, if it was issued by a United States magistrate.
68 FED. R. CRIM. P. 17 (e)(2) provides that "[a] subpoena directed to a witness in a foreign
country shall issue under the circumstances and in the manner and be served as provided in 28
U.S.C. § 1783."
28 U.S.C. § 1783 provides:
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viduals served in foreign countries may not be compelled to appear
before a grand jury.69 Anyone within the United States, however, is sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the federal district courts for the purpose of
issuance of grand jury subpoenas."0 Pursuant to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, a subpoena to appear before a grand jury may be
served anywhere in the United States.7 Thus, a potential banking wit-
ness must be in the United States before there can be any effort to compel
disclosure of protected information.7 2
With institutions, a contempt citation is issued upon the bank's re-
fusal to provide the information.7 3 The citation is accompanied with a
daily fine, which can be substantial.74 The purpose of the fine is to coerce
compliance with the subpoena.7 5
Individual witnesses, because of the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, which is inapplicable to institutions,76 are im-
munized7 7 against prosecution upon their initial refusal to answer ques-
tions by invoking their fifth amendment privilege.78 Upon continued
A court of the United States may order the issuance of a subpoena requiring the ap-
pearance as a witness before it, or before a person or body designated by it, or a national or
resident of the United States who is in a foreign country, or requiring the production of a
specified document or other thing by him, if the court finds that particular testimony or the
production of the document or other thing by him is necessary in the interest of justice,
and, in other than a criminal action or proceeding, if the court finds, in addition, that it is
not possible to obtain his testimony in admissible form without his personal appearance or
to obtain the production of the document or other thing in any other manner.
28 U.S.C. § 1783 (a)(1982).
These provisions reflect the obligation of citizens to respond to orders of the federal courts.
Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
69 See Blackmer, 284 U.S. 421; Webber v. United States, 395 F.2d. 397 (10th Cir. 1968); Ma-
rino v. U.S. Marshal, 326 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1963); Gilliards v. United States, 182 F.2d. 962 (D.C. Cir.
1950).
70 See Field, 532 F.2d at 404; United States v. Germann, 370 F.2d 1019, 1022-23 (2nd Cir.
1967).
71 FED. R. CrIM. P. 17(e)(1) states: "A subpoena requiring the attendance of a witness at a
hearing or trial may be served at any place within the United States."
72 In Field, 532 F.2d at 404, the court rejected a claim that the witness must be a resident of the
United States. Field had argued that the subpoena directed to "Tony Field, A/K/A Anthony Field,
Manager Castle Bank and Trust, Ltd. Georgetown, Cayman Islands" was a subpoena "directed to a
witness in a foreign country" under FED. R. CRiM. P. 17(e)(2), and could not be served in the United
States. Field, 532 F.2d at 409-10.
73 See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 494; Bank of Nova Scotia II, 740 F.2d at 817.
74 See Bank of Nova Scotia II, 740 F.2d at 818 (a fine of $25,000 per day for each day of non-
compliance had accumulated to $1,825,000); In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 496 (the fine against the
institution was $50,000 per day).
75 See supra note 74.
76 See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
77 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002, 6003 (1982).
78 See Field, 532 F.2d at 404; In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 494.
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refusal to answer, the witness is ordered jailed.7 9
These contempt orders are appealable upon an expedited basis re-
quiring disposition within thirty days.80 Because the issues involved in
these cases are generally substantial, courts have extended the thirty day
statutory period to allow full consideration,81 particularly if the con-
tempt order has been stayed pending appeal.8"
The only secrecy related case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court
involved a question of the procedures used by the U.S. government in
dealing with foreign banks. In United States v. Payner,83 a depositor of
an off-shore bank who was convicted of filing a false tax return84 chal-
lenged the methods used by the U.S. government to obtain the informa-
tion. These methods challenged in lower court cases,8" centered around
the taking, opening and searching of a locked briefcase belonging to a
foreign banker from the apartment of a woman who had been paid to
entertain the gentleman at dinner while IRS agents opened the briefcase
and photographed the documents.86 Subsequently, the same woman
traveled to the foreign bank and stole a rolodex from the banker's
office.87
Offended by these actions, which were undertaken with the approval
of government officials, in reliance on Supreme Court cases denying
standing to defendants to challenge illegal searches of the property of
others,88 the district court reversed the conviction, relying upon its su-
pervisory power, and the court of appeals affirmed.89
The Supreme Court reversed, and reinstated the conviction, holding
that the supervisory powers of the appellate courts could not be used as a
substitute for the standing requirements of the fourth amendment.90 The
79 See supra note 78. The term of confinement is limited to the life of the term of the grand
jury, including extensions, but in no event in excess of eighteen months. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1826(c)(2)(1982). These contempt citations are civil contempts.
80 28 U.S.C. § 1826(b)(1982).
81 See Field, 532 F.2d at 404; In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 494.
82 See supra note 81.
83 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
84 The taxpayer in Payner had falsely stated that he had no accounts in foreign banks. Id. at
728.
85 See Baskes, 433 F. Supp. at 799. It was claimed that in connection with Project Haven,
agents of the United States engaged in theft, warrantless seizure of property, unauthorized copying
of documents, prostitution, subornation of foreign officials, and violation of foreign laws, in order to
obtain evidence. The government's methods in Project Haven provoked an investigation in 1975 by
a subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations of the U.S. House of Representatives.
See Payner, 447 U.S. at 733 n.5.
86 Payner, 447 U.S. at 729-30, 738-41.
87 Id. at 741.
88 Id. at 730-31.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 737.
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dissenting justice objected that the Court's opinion effectively sanctioned
criminal conduct by government agents in pursuit of crime.91 Thus, the
issues reached the appellate courts.
C. The Issues
There are three principal issues in these cases: (1) the nature of the
foreign banking law;92 (2) the proper application of principles of interna-
tional comity, 93 and (3) the scope of fifth amendment protection against
self-incrimination.94
Bank secrecy laws are no more uniform than the cases dealing with
them, and tend to evolve as they are interpreted by U.S. courts. For
example, in 1959 when the Second Circuit decided Citibank ,9 it con-
cluded that Panamanian law96 did not preclude production of the records
because it did not limit the exception for review by "a competent author-
ity" to Panamanian authority. 97 The Second Circuit concluded that dis-
closure of the records to the "competent authority" of the U.S. Treasury
Department would not be a violation of Panamanian law.98 By 1962,
however, when the Second Circuit considered Application of Chase Man-
hattan Bank,99 Panama had a new law which specifically prohibited ex-
amination of business records by foreign authorities." °
91 Id. at 738 (Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun J.J., dissenting).
92 Citibank I, 271 F.2d at 616; Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d at 611; Ci-
tibank II, 396 F.2d at 897; Field, 532 F.2d at 404.
93 See, eg., Citibank I, 271 F.2d at 616; Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d at
611; Field, 532 F.2d at 404; Bank of Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1384; Bank of Nova Scotia I, 740
F.2d at 817.
94 Field, 532 F.2d at 404; In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 494.
95 271 F.2d 616.
96 The Panamanian Constitution provides in pertinent part: "Correspondence and other pri-
vate documents are inviolable and may not be seized or examined except by provision of a competent
authority and by means of legal formalities." PAN. CONsr. art. 29.
97 Id.
98 Citibank I, 271 F.2d at 619-20.
99 297 F.2d 611.
100 Law No. 17, Republic of Panama (1961), provided in pertinent part:
Article 89
The merchant furnishing a copy or reproductions of the contents of his books, corre-
spondence and other documents for use in an action abroad, in compliance with an order
of an authority not of the Republic of Panama, shall be penalized with a fine not greater
than one hundred balboas (B/100.00).
Article 93
The account books, correspondence and other documents which the merchant must
keep shall be maintained in his establishment in order that they may be examined by the
authority competent therefor. It is forbidden to remove them outside of the country. Vio-
lation of this prohibition shall be penalized with a fine not greater than one hundred bal-
boas (B/100.00).
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Moreover, while most foreign bank secrecy laws carry the teeth of
criminal sanctions, 1 not all do.' °2 The absence of attendant criminal
liability in the foreign country has been a factor when enforcing subpoe-
nas for foreign records. 10 3 Even when there are no criminal barriers to
production, however, at least one court has indicated a willingness still to
consider relieving the bank of the burden of production of protected
documents. 104
The universal issue in these cases is that of the proper application of
the principle of international comity. "Comity" has been defined as "a
nation's expression of understanding which demonstrates due regard
both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of persons
protected by its own laws."'' 0 5
Aside from procedural irregularities,"0 6 international comity princi-
The timing of the new law was indeed a "happy coincidence," for it was signed on January 30,
1961 - just in time to furnish a copy to the district court on the return day of the order to show
cause, February 2, 1961. Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d at 612. Such "coinci-
dences" have probably contributed to the occasional impatience shown foreign secrecy laws by some
of the courts of the United States.
For a similar provision limiting the definition of "competent authority" to authorities within the
foreign nation, see Bank of Nova Scotia , 691 F.2d at 1386 (citing § 10, Banks and Trusts Compa-
nies Regulations Act of 1965, 1965 Bah. Acts No. 64, as amended by the Banks and Trust Compa-
nies Regulation (Amendment) Act, 1980, 1980 Bah. Acts No. 3, which permits disclosure by order
of "any court of competent jurisdiction within The Bahamas, or under the provisions of any law of
The Bahamas").
101 See, e.g., Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962) (Panama, fine
equivalent to $100.00); Field, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1976) (Cayman Islands, fine of 1,000 pounds or
imprisonment up to a year or both); Fetco, 644 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1981) (Switzerland, imprison-
ment, and "in grave cases... imprisonment in a penitentiary"); Bank of Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d 817
(11th Cir. 1982) (Bahamas, fine of $15,000.00 or imprisonment up to two years or both). The Baha-
mian law equates violation of the banking act with the commonly accepted definition of a felony in
the United States.
102 See Citibank III, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1962) (involving the law of Germany which was
concededly not statutory, but in the nature of a privilege).
103 See id.
104 In Citibank III, although not faced with the question directly, the court said:
We would be reluctant to hold, however, that the mere absence of criminal sanctions
abroad necessarily mandates obedience to a subpoena.... The vital national interests of a
foreign nation, especially in matters relating to economic affairs, can be expressed in ways
other than through the criminal law.... Equally important is the fact that a sharp dichot-
omy between criminal and civil penalties is an imprecise means of measuring the hardship
for requiring compliance with a subpoena. ... It would be a gross fiction to contend that
if the Bundesbank [the central bank of Germany] were to revoke the license of Citibank for
a violation of bank secrecy the impact would be less catastrophic than having to pay an
insignificant fine because the revocation is theoretically not "equivalent to a misdemeanor"
or criminal sanction.
396 F.2d at 902.
105 Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972), quoted in Bank of Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1390.
106 In Field, 532 F.2d at 409, the witness argued that subpoenas to foreign bankers found in the
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ples are the only basis upon which an institution can avoid enforcement
of a subpoena when compliance is a violation of foreign law."0 7 The ar-
gument is equally available to individual witnesses, in addition to their
fifth amendment claims.108
Application of these principles, by definition, requires balancing of
the interests of the United States, the foreign nation and the individual.
The generally accepted scale 09 for this balancing test is the Restate-
ment." Of the five factors listed by the Restatement, the courts have
consistently considered each in bank secrecy cases.
The national interests of the United States in the reported cases,
particularly recently, have centered upon the extremely important effort
to stem narcotics traffic,' as well as the economic crimes of antitrust
United States were irregular under FED. R. CRIM P. 17, and that issuance of subpoenas in blank by
the clerk was contrary to Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). In Bank of Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d
at 1387, the court rejected the bank's contention that the government be required to demonstrate the
relevancy of the documents sought to the grand jury proceeding before production could be com-
pelled, and declined to follow In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield), 486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1973),
on subsequent appeal, 507 F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975). Cf. Payner,
447 U.S. at 727, concerning the procedures used by government agents to obtain evidence during the
Project Haven investigation of the use of secret bank accounts, discussed supra at notes 90-99 and
accompanying text.
107 See, eg., Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d at 612; In re Sealed Case, 825
F.2d at 494. Institutions have no fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. at 51; United States v. White, 322 U.S. at 699. One argument, which has been
rejected, states that the imposition of sanctions for failing to comply with a subpoena when compli-
ance is prohibited by foreign law offends due process under Soci6te Internationale Power Participa-
tions Industrielles v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958). Bank of Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1388-89.
108 Field, 532 F.2d at 404; In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 494.
109 See, eg., Citibank III, 396 F.2d at 902; Field, 532 F.2d at 407; Bank of Nova Scotia II, 740
F.2d at 827; In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 494.
110 RESTATEMENT (Second) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 40
(1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. The RESTATEMENT provides:
§ 40. Limitations on Exercise of Enforcement Jurisdiction
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the rules
they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person, each state is
required by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of its
enforcement jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions
would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the
other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be ex-
pected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
Id.
111 See Bank of Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1386; Bank of Nova Scotia , 740 F.2d at 817; Cf. In
re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 494 (involving money laundering, presumably of money obtained from
illegal narcotics trafficking in the United States).
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violations 1 2 and tax fraud schemes."13 The courts have noted the signifi-
cant interest of the foreign countries, which have occasionally inter-
vened.I 4  The Cayman Islands, for example, considers preservation of
bank secrecy vital to the expansion of the country's principal industry -
banking and off-shore finance. 15 The potential hardships upon the wit-
nesses in these cases have varied from minimal fines in the foreign na-
tion," 6 to substantial fines and imprisonment." 7
The third factor of the Restatement analysis, requiring consideration
of the extent to which the required action is to take place in the foreign
country, has been a highly relevant factor to one court,"18 and a very
insignificant factor to another.' 9 The courts have paid more attention to
the nationality of the person or institution involved when the witness in
jeopardy has been an alien,120 or an American institution. 21  The courts
have also considered that American depositors, who are the targets of the
investigations, would have no expectation of privacy in totally domestic
banking relationships.'22
The last Restatement factor, the effectiveness of enforcement, is
rarely discussed in the terms employed by the Restatement, but is closely
related to the national interest factor, and with that first factor has been
the predominant feature of the more recent decisions. The banks in-
volved in these cases are not themselves the targets of the investiga-
tions, 123 and therefore punishment of the banks and bankers for failure to
produce banking documents will have no direct impact on the narcotics,
tax or antitrust enforcement efforts. Certainly, however, the government
and the courts realize that if they can break down the barrier of bank
secrecy in these types of cases, they not only achieve access to vital evi-
112 See Citibank III, 396 F.2d at 897.
113 See FiELD, 532 F.2d at 404; Vetco, 691 F.2d at 1281. Practically all investigations implicat-
ing secret foreign bank accounts include criminal tax claims as well, since the "secret" funds ob-
tained illegally were likely not reported as income. See Bank of Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1384.
114 See Bank of Nova Scotia II, 740 F.2d at 817; In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 494.
115 See Bank of Nova Scotia II, 740 F.2d at 827.
116 See Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d at 612, where the penalty for violation
of the foreign laws was equivalent to a $100 fine.
117 See, supra note 101 (for a discussion of various foreign laws.
118 See In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 498. In that case, the fact that the bank would be
required to violate a foreign nation's law on that nation's soil was very significant to the court's
refusal to enforce the subpoena.
119 See Bank of Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1390. In that case, the court noted that the fact that
subpoenaed documents were located in the foreign country was irrelevant, for disclosure was going
to be made in the United States, and therefore the affront to the foreign sovereign would occur no
matter where the information was originally located.
120 See In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 497-98; Field, 532 F.2d at 407.
121 See Citibank III, 396 F.2d at 905; Citibank I, 271 F.2d at 618.
122 Bank of Nova Scotia II, 740 F.2d at 828.
123 See, eg., In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 498; Bank of Nova Scotia 1, 691 F.2d at 1390.
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dence of past crimes, 124 but also impose a higher risk of discovery on
those who would use secret accounts for illegal purposes. By forcing
would-be wrongdoers to abandon secret accounts as a method of opera-
tion, the government increases the chances of crime detection, and possi-
bly even prevention. To that extent, enforcement of subpoenas against
foreign bankers has a significant potential "to achieve compliance with
the rule prescribed by" the United States.125
Nonetheless, the ultimate issue for the courts in these cases is
whether the potential enforcement benefits outweigh the damage to the
rule of law done by a court ordering violations of law.126 In other purely
domestic contexts, the courts of the United States have been vehement in
their refusal to sanction illegal activities undertaken against defendants
for crime detection and prevention, even when the court is involved only
indirectly. 127 To some extent, the federal courts may well have devel-
oped a double standard for dealing with bank secrecy cases. 128
Just as success against domestic banks with foreign branches em-
boldened the government to expand subpoena power to foreign banks, so
too has success of claims that domestic criminal investigations eclipse the
demands of foreign law, caused the government to alter its position in
these cases. In United States v. First National City Bank ("Citibank
II"), the government argued that to be excused from compliance with
the subpoena, the bank had to show it would suffer criminal liability in
the foreign country. 129 In recent years, however, the government has
conceded criminality in the foreign jurisdiction, arguing instead that it
just does not matter. 130
The final issue is the scope of the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination in cases involving individual bankers. 131 Can the gov-
ernment compel testimony from an individual by the grant of immunity
from U.S. prosecution when that testimony may be the basis of prosecu-
tion by a foreign nation?
It is settled that the constitutional protection of the fifth amendment
extends to aliens legally in the United States, especially when a U.S.
*court has asserted jurisdiction over that alien by serving him with a
grand jury subpoena.132 In bank secrecy cases, the government's applica-
124 See Field, 532 F.2d at 409; HoUSE REPORT, supra note 8, at 4397.
125 RESTATEMENT supra note 110.
126 See In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 499.
127 See, eg., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341-47 (1943).
128 See infra notes 281-289 and accompanying text.
129 396 F.2d at 901-902.
130 See, eg., In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 498; Field, 532 F.2d at 406.
131 See In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 497-98; Field, 532 F.2d at 406-7.
132 See, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commis-
sion, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931).
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tion for immunity from prosecution for the foreign banker is a concession
to the applicability of the privilege against self-incrimination to the
banker's situation before the grand jury.133
Neither the problem of privilege nor the possibility of dual prosecu-
tion are unique to foreign secrecy cases. U.S. courts have dealt with each
problem at length in different contexts.
Testimonial privileges have been claimed in many contexts in the
United States. 134 The U.S. Supreme Court has accepted that even crimi-
nal investigations must yield to a properly invoked privilege. 135
Moreover, it is unlikely that any country has as much experience in
handling the question of multiple prosecution by different jurisdictions as
does the United States, with its federal and state governments. Ostensi-
bly, the Supreme Court settled the question of the threat of prosecution
by a "foreign" jurisdiction in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission ("Mur-
phy"). 136 In Murphy, the Court held that before a witness may be com-
pelled to give incriminating testimony about himself under a grant of
immunity, the immunity must be as broad as the threat of prosecution.' 37
A witness may not constitutionally be compelled to testify in a state
court proceeding unless he is provided immunity from at least the use of
his testimony in a prosecution by another state or by the federal
government.13
8
Indeed, U.S. courts have even considered the question when the
compelled testimony is incriminating under foreign laws. In fact, lower
federal courts have held that the threat of foreign prosecution triggers
fifth amendment protection and prohibits compulsion of the testimony
from the witness.' 39
The Supreme Court considered, but did not decide, this issue in Zi-
carelli v. New Jersey Investigation Commission. 'I In that case, the Court
recognized that a substantial risk of prosecution in a foreign jurisdiction
squarely presents the question of a witness' right to invoke the constitu-
tional protection against self-incrimination, but found it unnecessary to
define the scope of the protection, ruling in that case that there was no
133 See Field, 532 F.2d 404.
134 The most generally recognized privileges are those of attorney/client and priest/penitent.
Executive privilege has been claimed by the President of the United States, and has been recognized
in its proper place by the Supreme Court. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). There is
no banker/depositor privilege recognized in the United States. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
21 (1976).
135 See, e.g., Nixon, 418 U.S. at 683.
136 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 See In re Cardassi, 351 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Conn. 1972).
140 406 U.S. 472 (1972).
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real and substantial risk of foreign prosecution for the witness.141 This
substantial question of the scope of fifth amendment protection has been
considered twice by federal courts in the context of foreign secrecy provi-
sions,142 but has been side-stepped on both occasions. 14 3
III. RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT
For thirty years, the federal courts have been called upon to resolve
the conflict between federal investigations and foreign secrecy laws. Half
of the cases have been decided before 1970;' 44 half have come after. 14
5
There is significance to this date. It was in 1970 that the House Commit-
tee on Banking and Currency issued its report,"4 which was so heavily
relied upon by the court in Field.4 7 It was the year in which Congress
began to act to curb the abuses cited, with passage of the Bank Secrecy
Act of 1970,'14 and the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting
Act of 1970,149 requiring taxpayers to disclose any interest in foreign
accounts. 15
Undoubtedly, these changes in the landscape of American law
played a significant role in the changing decisions after 1970; for before
the new legislation, the courts showed a willingness to relieve banking
institutions of the burden of subpoenas requiring violation of foreign law
in deference to the foreign nations.'' After the 1970 change in perspec-
tive, the courts had uniformly refused to modify these subpoenas,'52 until
141 Id.
142 Field, 532 F.2d at 404; In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 494.
143 See supra note 142. See also infra notes 218-222, 234-236, and accompanying text.
144 Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d at 611; Citibank III, 396 F.2d at 897;
Citibank I, 271 F.2d at 616. Cf Ings v. Ferguson, 262 F.2d at 149 (a civil case involving issues of
compelled production of bank documents in violation of foreign law).
145 In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 494; Bank of Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1384; Bank of Nova
Scotia II, 740 F.2d at 817; Vetco, 644 F.2d at 1324; Field, 532 F.2d at 404. The five modem cases
have developed a bit of a family aura: Judge Fay, the trial judge in Field, was on the panel which
decided Bank of Nova Scotia I, and wrote for the court in Bank of Nova Scotia II. Judge Morgan,
who wrote the opinion in Field, was also on the Bank of Nova Scotia I panel. Finally, Judge Bork, a
member of the panel for In re Sealed Case, signed the Brief in Opposition to the Petition for Certio-
rari as Solicitor General of the United States in Field.
146 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 8.
147 532 F.2d at 408-9.
148 Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, title 1 (1970).
149 Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, title 11
(1970).
15o Id. It was the failure to report a foreign account for which the taxpayer was convicted in
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
151 See Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d at 611; Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d at
149.
152 See Bank of Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1384; Bank of Nova Scotia II, 740 F.2d at 817;
Vetco, 644 F.2d at 1324 (an IRS summons); Field, 532 F.2d at 404.
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the decision in In re Sealed Case.1 3
The tone of the decisions changed as well. In Ings v. Ferguson,154
the court proclaimed: "Upon fundamental principles of international
comity, our courts dedicated to the enforcement of our laws should not
take such action as may cause a violation of the law of a friendly neigh-
bor or, at the least, an unnecessary circumvention of its procedures."15
Even in connection with underlying criminal proceedings, the court in
Application of Chase Manhattan Bank,156 observed of the government's
attempted circumvention of foreign law:
Such a maneuver scarcely reflects the kind of respect which we
should acccord to the laws of a friendly foreign sovereign state. Just as
we would expect and require branches of foreign banks to abide by our
laws applicable to the conduct of their business in this country, so
should we honor their laws affecting our bank branches which are per-
mitted to do business in foreign countries. 157
Twenty years later, however, the Eleventh Circuit abandoned any
deference to foreign statutes, ruling: "[T]his court simply cannot acqui-
esce in the proposition that United States criminal investigations must be
thwarted whenever there is conflict with the interest of other states."15 8
In the final analysis, there is nothing left but for the courts to resolve
these inevitable conflicts. In resolving the three principal issues of the
scope of the foreign law,159 the appropriate role of comity, 6° and the
applicability of the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimina-
tion,"' the courts have developed a methodology which relies heavily on
the good faith of the witness and close scrutiny of the foreign law. In the
difficult cases, the courts rely ultimately on simply choosing whether
U.S. criminal laws or foreign banking laws will have primacy in federal
investigations.
A. Good Faith
"Good faith" has been a part of every case, even when the courts
have declined to compel production of the subpoenaed documents. 62 In
153 825 F.2d at 494.
154 282 F.2d at 149.
155 Id. at 152.
156 297 F.2d 611.
157 Id. at 613.
158 Bank of Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1391 (citing Field, 532 F.2d at 404).
159 See Vetco, 644 F.2d at 1324; Citibank I, 396 F.2d at 897; Citibank I, 271 F.2d at 616.
160 See In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 494; Bank of Nova Scotia 1, 691 F.2d at 1384; Bank of
Nova Scotia I1, 740 F.2d 817; Field, 532 F.2d at 404.
161 See In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d 494; Field, 532 F.2d 404.
162 See, e.g., Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d at 611 (bank produced records in
its New York office while objecting to production of Panamanian records).
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these cases, the element of good faith has been an essential ingredient to a
successful challenge to sanctions imposed for failure to comply with the
subpoena. 163 While good faith is no guarantee of relief,164 "bad faith"
has been a sure precursor to enforcement of sanctions. 65
As a minimum, good faith requires that the witness, bank or individ-
ual be willing to supply information clearly outside the reach of foreign
law. 66 This includes documents which may be located in domestic
branches, 67 and information which has been obtained outside of the
banking relationship. 168  Good faith also requires 169 the witness to en-
deavor to gather the information requested, and may require use of the
means available under the foreign act to attempt to comply with the
subpoena. 170
Of the half-dozen appellate cases17 ' dealing directly with the conflict
between grand jury investigations and foreign secrecy laws, United States
v. Bank of Nova Scotia ("Bank of Nova Scotia II")172 is the paradigm of
bad faith. Indeed, while the discussion of comity, balancing, foreign
laws, and alternatives to compelled production are both thorough and
informative in Bank of Nova Scotia II, the case involved virtually none of
those issues by the time it reached the appellate court.
Although the bank initially pleaded the impossibility of complying
with the subpoena because of secrecy laws in the Bahamas and Cayman
Islands, 171 the government of each country had authorized release of the
documents in question within days of the commencement of the sanc-
tions.' 74 Upon authorization by the government of the Cayman Islands
163 See id. The subpoena, though modified, was left outstanding "to insure that Chase com-
plied with its duty of actively cooperating with the Government' if the Government asked the Pana-
manian authorities to authorize the Panama branch to produce the documents." Id. at 613.
164 See, eg., Field, 532 F.2d at 404.
165 See, eg., Bank of Nova Scotia I, 740 F.2d at 817; Vetco, 644 F.2d at 1324.
166 Cf. Citibank II1, 396 F.2d at 900 (the district court premised a lack of good faith on the
bank's failure to make inquiries into the nature or extent of foreign records and failure to produce
records clearly not covered by the claimed privilege).
167 See Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d at 611.
168 Cf. In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 495 (the individual witness testified about his personal
relationships with various targets of the grand jury, but not about his banking relationships).
169 Cf. Bank of Nova Scotia I, 740 F.2d at 817; Citibank III, 396 F.2d at 897 (the bank's
failure to search its records was viewed as a lack of good faith).
170 Cf Bank of Nova Scotia I, 740 F.2d at 820 (the court made note of the fact that the bank
had not appealed the adverse ruling on its application for release of the records).
171 In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 494; Bank of Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1384; Bank of Nova
Scotia II, 740 F.2d at 817; Field, 532 F.2d at 404;Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d at
611; Citibank III, 396 F.2d at 897.
172 740 F.2d 817.
173 Id. at 820.
174 Sanctions had been stayed until November 14, 1983. On November 11, the Attorney Gen-
eral of the Bahamas issued an order authorizing production of the Bahamian documents. The Gov-
ernor of the Cayman Islands authorized disclosure of those documents on November 17. Id. at 821.
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three days after the sanctions began, the bank delivered the documents
located in that country. Of the $1,825,000 fine, though, $1,725,000 was
assessed for the bank's failure to produce the documents from the Baha-
mas,17 the production of which had been authorized before the sanctions
took effect.' 76 The bank "was just sloppy in its search,"' 77 which it had
not begun until well after the subpoena was initially issued. 17
8
While the documents in the Caymans were subject to the secrecy
law at the time sanctions were imposed, 179 the Eleventh Circuit noted
that during the pendency of the proceedings the bank had applied to the
Grand Court of the Cayman Islands for permission to release the docu-
ments, but did not appeal the denial of its petition. 80 Moreover, the
court in the Cayman Islands had granted leave to reapply, but there is no
indication that the bank had done so until the sanctions were about to
take effect.' 8 '
The lack of good faith and the strong implication of purposeful de-
lay on the part of the bank182 were more significant factors in Bank of
Nova Scotia II than the international issues.
B. Close Scrutiny
Questions of good faith go hand in glove with close scrutiny of the
foreign secrecy laws. For instance, in Citibank 111,183 extensive expert
testimony made it clear that the German secrecy doctrine applied only to
material entrusted to a bank within the framework of any confidential
relationship of bank and customer, but not to records that were the
bank's own work product.'84 Nonetheless, the bank had failed to pro-
duce even its own records that were within the terms of the subpoena.' 85
Additionally, close analysis of the German law in Citibank III dis-
closed that bank secrecy was neither statutory nor were violations crimi-
nal.' 86 It was most akin to common law concepts of a privilege,187 but
175 Id.
176 The bank conceded the validity of the contempt order as it applied to the refusal to produce
the Bahamian documents. Id. at 820 n.2, and at 826 n.14.
177 Id. at 832.
178 The subpoena was served March 4, 1983. Id. at 820. It was not until November 24 that a
bank official went to the Bahamas to insure that an effective search had been conducted. Id. at 822.
179 Id. at 826.
180 Id. at 820.
181 The original petition was denied May 31. A second petition was denied November 11, but
the contempt order had been entered on October 21, and stayed by the Court of Appeals until
November 14. Id. at 820-21.
182 Id. at 826.
183 396 F.2d at 897.
184 Id. at 900, 905.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 899-900, 903-04.
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unlike traditional privileges of physicians, attorneys and accountants,
which Germany backed with criminal penalties for breach,188 there was
no corresponding penalty for breach of bank confidences. 189 Moreover,
it appeared that German law provided the bank with a defense to any
civil action if the bank acted under compulsion of a court order. 190 Per-
haps most important to the Second Circuit in enforcing the subpoena was
that, in spite of being privileged to refuse to testify in civil proceedings,
German bankers could not refuse to obey a court order to provide evi-
dence in a criminal proceeding in Germany. 191
Similar scrutiny of Swiss law in United States v. Vetco, Inc.
("Vetco") 192 revealed that Switzerland distinguished between public and
private interests in keeping information secret.193 A representative of the
Swiss Federal Attorney testified that the matters involved in Vetco did
not concern a totally Swiss interest in confidentiality and that there
might be a defense to a Swiss criminal charge where production was pur-
suant to an order of a U.S. court.194
C. Hard Cases
The remaining cases of the genre are not as easily analyzed and rep-
resent the truly difficult choices which the courts must make when con-
fronted with intractable conflict.
In United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia ("Bank of Nova Scotia
1",),195 a tax and narcotics investigation,' 96 the bank had presented an
affidavit that compliance with the subpoena could expose the bank to
prosecution under the Bahamian bank secrecy law, but that the U.S. gov-
ernment could obtain an order of judicial assistance from the Supreme
Court of the Bahamas allowing disclosure if the subject of the grand jury
investigation were a crime under Bahamian law and not criminal solely
under U.S. tax laws. 197
The U.S. Government, however, declined to seek the assistance of
187 See id.
188 Id. at 903.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 900 n.6.
191 Id. at 903-04.
192 644 F.2d 1324, as amended, 691 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1981). This case involved IRS sum-
monses, rather than grand jury subpoenas, and Vetco, an American corporation, was the taxpayer
and target of the investigation. While there are significant differences from the grand jury cases,
Vetco is nonetheless instructive both for its handling of the conflict and its exposition of Swiss law.
193 Bank of Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1289.
194 Id.
195 691 F.2d at 1384.
196 Id. at 1386.
197 Id. at 1387.
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the Bahamian court.198 The Eleventh Circuit concurred with that deci-
sion, ruling that applying for judicial assistance was not a substantially
equivalent means for obtaining production because of the cost in time
and money and the uncertain likelihood of success in light of the tax
aspects of the investigation. 99
The Eleventh Circuit also rejected the bank's argument that the de-
cision in Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Com-
merciales v. Rogers ("Societe Internationale")," °  prohibited the
imposition of sanctions when compliance with a court order was inter-
dicted by foreign laws. In accordance with the Ninth Circuit in Vetco,
Inc.,2"' the court in Bank of Nova Scotia I refused to read Societe Inter-
nationale so broadly.202 The court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court
had left open the possibility of sanctions other than dismissal in that civil
case in which the foreign plaintiff, in good faith,203 was enjoined from
disclosing Swiss records by the Swiss government.2°
Finally, balancing the interests of the two nations involved, the
Eleventh Circuit expressed frustration that a statute that was "hardly a
blanket guarantee of privacy"20 5 would require a U.S. court to afford
greater protection to depositors than a Bahamian tribunal.20 6 The court
resolved the conflict by giving primacy to U.S. criminal laws, and exhib-
ited impatience with the foreign law in concluding: "Absent direction
from the Legislative and Executive branches of our federal government,
we are not willing to emasculate the grand jury process whenever a for-
eign nation attempts to block our criminal justice process. '207  Obvi-
ously, more than just the passage of twenty years separated the Eleventh
Circuit from the earlier opinion of the Second Circuit: "The Govern-
ment... has a real interest in civil and criminal cases in obtaining evi-
dence wherever located. However, we also have an obligation to respect
the laws of other sovereign states even though they may differ in eco-
198 Id. at 1390.
199 Id. at 1390-91. The court did not compare the cost of applying for judicial assistance to
obtain the records under Bahamian law with the sum of $8000, which the IRS spent to steal the
foreign bank records in United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. at 727.
200 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
201 691 F.2d at 1287-88.
202 691 F.2d at 1388-89.
203 The Eleventh Circuit noted the district court's finding that the bank had not acted in good
faith, but did not elaborate on the basis for that finding. Id. at 1389. If the lack of good faith had
been as egregious as that in Bank of Nova Scotia II, discussed at supra notes 172-182 and accompa-
nying text, the court of appeals presumably would have been more scathing in its comments.
204 Id. at 1389.
205 Id. at 1391 (citing Payner 447 U.S. at 727).
206 Id. at 1391.
207 Id.
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nomic and legal philosophy from our own. '208
Because of the very personal punishment of imprisonment, the cases
involving individual foreign bankers are the most difficult of the bank
secrecy cases. Even in Field,20 9 the court expressed its regret that its
decision required Mr. Field to violate the legal commands of the Cayman
Islands.21°
Field, a Canadian citizen, was the managing director of Castle Bank
and Trust Company (Cayman), Ltd. and resided in the Cayman Islands
with his family.211 There was no suggestion that he had any contacts
with the United States other than his presence at the Miami airport when
he was served.212 By affidavit, an expert on Cayman law asserted that
not only would Field be subject to criminal punishment for answering
the questions before the grand jury, but also if he refused to answer the
Cayman authorities concerning whether or not he had testified. 213 The
government did not contest this evidence;214 the district court found that
there was "a reasonable probability that Mr. Field [was] going to be ex-
posed to some criminal charges and some criminal punishment for violat-
ing the Cayman Bank Secrecy Act. ' 215 The court of appeals left these
findings undisturbed.
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit required Field to testify. The court
rejected his comity argument, in large part relying upon the fact that the
director of banking in the Cayman Islands would be able to obtain infor-
mation from Field in Cayman investigations.216 In the words of the
court, "[W]e find it difficult to understand how the bank's customers'
rights of privacy would be significantly infringed simply because the in-
vestigating body is a foreign tribunal. 21 7
The Fifth Circuit also rejected the foreign banker's fifth amendment
claim.21 8 In their opinion, the fact that the testimony constituted a "ver-
bal act" crime, rather than a recitation of evidence of a crime placed it
outside the scope of the fifth amendment protection against self-
incrimination.21 9
208 Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d at 613.
209 532 F.2d 404.
210 Id. at 410.
211 Id. at 405-06.
212 Id. at 405.
213 Id. at 406.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 408.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 406-07.
219 Id. For the D.C. Circuit's view, see In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d 494 (1987), discussed infra
at notes 223-248. The D.C. Circuit, in ruling on the individual banker's fifth amendment claim,
assumed that the compelled "verbal act" crime was within the amendment's protection, but con-
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In spite of the Court's recognition that under Zicarelli v. New Jersey
Investigation Commission,220 a substantial risk of prosecution in a foreign
country squarely presents the question of a witness's right to invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination, 221 and in spite of the Court's finding
that Field faced such a substantial risk, certiorari was denied in Field.'
The most recent case, In re Sealed Case,223 combines all the ele-
ments of thirty years of the jurisprudence of conflict between federal
criminal investigations and foreign secrecy laws. There were individual
and institutional witnesses, as well as foreign government intervention," 4
good faith, the fifth amendment, and international comity.
The grand jury investigating a money laundering scheme 225 sought
records in Country Y which has a secrecy law.226 The foreign bank,
owned by the government of Country X, had a branch in Country Y and
an agency in the United States.22 7 The manager of the U.S. agency, the
individual witness, was a citizen of Country X and had been assistant
manager of the Country Y branch.228 Additionally, he was a personal
friend and business associate of several of the targets of the investiga-
tion.229 The manager testified about his personal dealings with these in-
dividuals, and the bank produced subpoenaed documents for customers
from whom it had obtained releases.2 30 Both the individual and the
bank, however, refused to disclose any other information on the ground
that to do so would subject them to criminal prosecution in Country Y
for violation of the bank secrecy law.231' Following a grant of immunity
to the manager, the district court held both in contempt for their contin-
cluded that he could be compelled to testify, not because the testimony was outside the scope of the
amendment, but because he would be subject to foreign prosecution only if he voluntarily traveled to
the foreign country. In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 497. Mr. Field, of course, with his job and
family in the Cayman Islands, realistically had no such alternative. To this extent, Field and In Re
Sealed Case are in apparent conflict on the scope of the fifth amendment's protection.
220 406 U.S. 472 (1972).
221 Id. at 478.
222 429 U.S. 940. A factor in the denial of certiorari may have been that, during the pendency
of the petition, the grand jury to which Field had been subpoenaed had been discharged and conse-
quently, the contempt sanction which had been appealed was no longer viable. Brief for the United
States in Opposition at 3, n.1, id. (No. 76-1739).
223 825 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Roe v. United States, - U.S. -, 108 S. CL
451 (1987).
224 Country X, the country whose government owned the bank involved, delivered a note
verbale to the Department of State, requesting that no compulsion be ordered against its bank. Id. at
496.
225 Id. at 495.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id.
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ued refusal to testify, ordering the manager to be sent to prison and fining
the bank $50,000 per day.2" 2
Although the fifth amendment claim of the manager in In re Sealed
Case was indistinguishable from the one in Field,233 the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit, without reference to the earlier case,23 4 decided the issue
on an entirely different basis.2 3 Rather than concluding that the fifth
amendment was not implicated in cases of "verbal act" crimes as had the
Fifth Circuit, this circuit ruled that the fear of foreign prosecution of the
manager was not real and substantial because he could be prosecuted
only if he voluntarily returned to Country Y.236
In contrast, the court became the first in twenty-five years to decline
to enforce the subpoena against the bank for comity reasons,237 distin-
guishing Bank of Nova Scotia I and Bank of Nova Scotia II. The court
distinguished the second case by virtue of the extensive evidence indicat-
ing that the bank there had not acted in good faith." 8 The District of
Columbia Circuit's effort to distinguish Bank of Nova Scotia 1, however,
is not very satisfying.
For instance, while Bank of Nova Scotia I did involve a dispute over
a U.S. agency's ability to obtain the documents from the foreign
banks,2 39 the issue was resolved against the agency in the district
court.2" Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit regarded the question of pro-
duction of the documents from the foreign country as irrelevant in con-
sidering the comity argument, since disclosure was to occur in the United
States and the insult to the Bahamas was the same whether the court
232 Id. at 496.
233 Compare id. ("The manager based his refusal to testify on fifth amendment grounds, claim-
ing that the act of testifying would subject him to criminal sanctions in Country Y.") with Field, 532
F.2d at 406 (Field contended "that since the act of testifying subjects him to foreign prosecution,
requiring his testimony would be compelling Field to be a witness against himself.").
234 The court characterized the issues in the case as ones of first impression, which was true for
that court of appeals, but was not the case throughout all the federal appellate courts. In re Sealed
Case, 825 F.2d at 496 n. 1.
235 The court of appeals declined to follow the district court, which found that there was no
"real and substantial" danger of foreign prosecution because of the grand jury secrecy provisions of
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6. Some earlier decisions relied upon this provision to avoid fifth amendment
claims relating to foreign prosecution. See, eg., In re Tierney, 465 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1972). The
fact that many grand jury proceedings are not secret, for many reasons including authorized release
of grand jury testimony for use in the criminal proceedings, has led the courts to reject this rule as
the ultimate safeguard of a fundamental right. See United States v. Flanagan, 691 F.2d 116 (2d Cir.
1982).
236 In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 497. See the discussion in supra note 219, concerning com-
parison with the decision in Field.
237 The last successful challenge to a subpoena for documents protected from disclosure by
foreign law had been in 1962. Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962).
239 In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 498.
239 Compare id with Bank of Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1387.
240 Bank of Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1387.
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required violation of Bahamian law by Bahamian entities in the United
States or in the Bahamas.24
The analysis by the District of Columbia Circuit was quite different.
Proceeding from the proposition that "[it] causes us considerable discom-
fort to think that a court of law should order a violation of law, particu-
larly on the territory of the sovereign whose law is in question, 2 42 the
court declared, "[m]ost important to our decision is the fact that these
sanctions represent an attempt by an American court to compel a foreign
person to violate the laws of a different foreign sovereign on that sover-
eign's own territory."' 43 The court noted that balancing foreign law
against domestic interests can involve subjective evaluation of the foreign
acts, 2' bringing courts near the Act of State Doctrine.24 Concluding its
opinion, the court echoed the sentiments of the earliest cases from the
Second Circuit: "Though we recognize that the grand jury's investiga-
tion may nonetheless be hampered, perhaps significantly, we are unable
to uphold the contempt order against the bank."246
While the decision in In re Sealed Case has been hailed as a
landmark return to an era of more civil application of the principles of
international comity,247 it is most disconcerting that protection for the
bank was gained at the expense of its manager,248 who was, after all,
ordered by the same court, in the same opinion, to violate the same law,
the violation of which by the bank the court found too distasteful to
compel.
IV. AVOIDING CONFLICT
According to the Field court, "[c]ourts and legislatures should take
every reasonable precaution to avoid placing individuals in the situation
Mr. Field finds himself."249 There are currently laws and procedures
which help to avoid even more conflict than actually occurs.
Domestically, the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting
Act of 1970250 and the regulations implementing it25' have helped avoid
241 Id. at 1390.
242 In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 498.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 499.
245 Id. (citing Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897); Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964)). The Act of State Doctrine cautions courts against sitting in
judgment on the acts of foreign governments done within the foreign state. Id.
246 Compare 825 F.2d at 499 with Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d at 613.
247 See Florida Bar News, Sept. 1, 1987, at 10.
248 As the court in In re Sealed Case said, "It is therefore also relevant to our conclusion that
the grand jury is not left empty-handed by today's decision. The manager will be available and able
to testify as to many of the facts that the grand jury may wish to ascertain." 825 F.2d at 499.
249 Field, 532 F.2d at 410.
250 P.L. 91-508 (1970).
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conflict. The purpose of the Act was "to require certain reports or
records where such reports or records have a high degree of usefulness in
criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings." '252 By requir-
ing individuals and institutions subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States to report foreign transactions and authority over foreign ac-
counts,253 the Act provides domestic sources for uncovering criminal use
of foreign accounts.
Treaties25 4 and agreements 255 between the United States and foreign
nations providing for assistance in obtaining necessary evidence of crimi-
nal conduct are also in place and provide an alternative to compelled
violation of foreign law.2" 6 The impatience of U.S. courts with foreign
responses to requests for judicial assistance2 7 overlooks the fact that the
U.S. Judicial Assistance Act2"' also prohibits disclosure of privileged ma-
terial in response to a request for assistance.25 9 U.S. courts ought not to
expect more from foreign courts than they themselves are willing to
provide.
While foreign nations tend to exclude such assistance in matters re-
lating solely to violation of U.S. tax laws,26° only one of the grand jury
cases in which evidence was compelled in the last thirty years was such a
case. 261 Thus, these agreements can avoid much of the conflict.
The laws of foreign nations, as well, currently provide alternatives
251 31 C.F.R. § 103.24 (1987).
252 P.L. 91-508, § 202 (1970).
253 31 U.S.C. § 5314 (formerly 31 U.S.C. §§ 1121 & 1122). See Bank of Nova Scotia II, 740
F.2d at 828.
254 Eg., Convention on Double Taxation of Income, Sept. 27, 1951, United States-Switzerland,
2 U.S.T. 1751, T.I.A.S. No. 2316. For a discussion of this treaty's application to disclosure, see
United States v. Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d at 1285-86.
255 For a discussion of the proposed Gentlemen's Agreement between the United States and
the Cayman Islands, see Bank of Nova Scotia II, 740 F.2d at 829-30.
256 Cf., Ings v. Ferguson, a civil case, 282 F.2d at 153 (the court stated, "The zeal of the Trustee
... should not be the basis for permitting him to avoid following the prescribed process for seeking
information in a foreign country.").
257 See Bank of Nova Scotia II, 740 F.2d 817.
258 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1982).
259 Id.
260 See, eg., United States v. Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d 1281 (Swiss law); Bank of Nova Scotia I, 691
F.2d 1384 (Bahamian law).
261 Field, 532 F.2d 404. In Bank of Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d 1384, the investigation involved
narcotics as well as tax. The case of Vetco, 691 F.2d 1281, was a summons proceeding, rather than a
grand jury case. It is an unresolved question, from the reported cases, whether foreign governments
would honor requests for information in mixed cases such as Bank of Nova Scotia I. In that case, the
government never tried to obtain the information by judicial assistance of the Bahamian court. 691
F.2d at 1390. In Bank of Nova Scotia II, the court reported that the Governor of the Cayman
Islands had informed U.S. officials: "[ilt is only fair to say that I do foresee difficulty [in] the type of
case which is clearly criminal but also has tax prosecution possibilities." Bank of Nova Scotia , 740
F.2d at 830. Again, though, since the United States never tried the procedure, it is impossible to say
19s88]
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for those faced with compelled disclosure. In the first place, foreign stat-
utes generally permit disclosure with the consent of the customer.262 Ad-
ditionally, the bank can apply for permission to disclose the information
in accordance with local law. 263 Foreign courts, faced with conflicting
demands on their citizens and residents, are equally constrained with
U.S. courts to give good faith consideration to the factors which illumi-
nate the principle of international comity.264
Some additional changes in law and procedure could avoid even
more conflicts. The record-keeping financial regulations initiated in 1970
apply only to domestic banks.265 There is no reason that Congress could
not extend these recording provisions to the branches and agencies of
foreign banks within the United States to the extent of their American
operations.266 Such a law would provide additional domestic documen-
tation of foreign transactions. without imposing upon the prerogatives of
foreign sovereigns.267
The investigators and the courts could also modify their procedures.
The refusal of investigating authorities to attempt alternative methods of
obtaining the records involved in these cases is a thrown gauntlet.26  It
results in some brilliant displays of raw power, which may have a pro-
what the response of the Cayman authorities may have been to such a request. It is instructive,
however, that the Cayman government did ultimately authorize disclosure of the records. Id. at 821.
262 See, eg., Vetco, 691 F.2d 1281 (Swiss law); Bank of Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d 1384 (Baha-
mian law); In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d 494 ("Country " law).
263 See, e.g., Bank of Nova Scotia II.
264 Presumably, foreign courts will engage in the same balancing exercise as their U.S. counter-
parts, weighing the interests of their country and residents against those of the other country, in this
case the United States. See, eg., Bank of Nova Scotia II, 740 F.2d at 827-28. The court in Bank of
Nova Scotia I cites the following from United States v. Carver, (Jamaica Ct. App. 1982):
It would appear that the policy of the legislature is that Confidentiality Laws of the Cay-
man Islands should not be used as a blanket device to encourage or foster criminal activi-
ties .... [T]here is nothing in the statute to suggest that it is the public policy of the
Cayman Islands to permit a person to launder the proceeds of crime in the Cayman Is-
lands, secure from detection and punishment.
Bank of Nova Scotia 11, 740 F. 2d at 820. The Court of Appeals in Jamaica is the appellate court for
the Cayman Islands. Id.
265 See California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
266 The most likely source of objections to the extension of reporting requirements to domestic
offices of foreign banks may be the foreign governments involved. If they do object, it will only
emphasize the importance those countries place on their secrecy laws. The resolution of any such
objections will allow the legislature to consider the problems of resolving these facts.
267 The domestic agencies and branches of foreign institutions have been willing to provide
records which are located within the United States in response to subpoenas. See, eg., Ings v. Fergu-
son, 282 F.2d at 151.
268 The Department of Justice has taken the position that "it would 'violate good sense and
reason' to forego the use of the subpoena power in these circumstances." Bank of Nova Scotia I,
740 F.2d at 830 (quoting Deputy Assistant Attorney General Roger Olsen).
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phylactic effect on Americans considering use of foreign accounts,269 but
harms the courts' role as protectors of the rule of law when they order
violations of law.27
These confrontational tactics are contrary to the admonition by the
court in Field to "take every reasonable precaution ' 27 1 to avoid these
conflicts. Executive branches ought to be similarly bound, and the courts
could enforce the use of reasonable efforts to avoid conflict by requiring
that the investigators make use of available alternatives before imposing
sanctions and compelling illegal acts.272 Putting non-resident aliens in
jail or compelling violation of foreign laws ought to be done as a last
resort, not simply taken as the path of least resistance.
The courts could avoid conflicts by requiring a showing of the im-
portance and relevance of the evidence sought. This suggestion has been
fiercely resisted in the Eleventh Circuit as an unwarranted restriction on
the powers of grand juries.273 Nonetheless, the courts ought to recognize
orders compelling violation of foreign laws for the drastic remedies that
they are,274 and make some accommodation in these limited cases to as-
sure that the remedy is appropriate.275 It is difficult to understand how
the courts can decide that subpoenaed documents are vital to the na-
tional interests of the United States with no showing of the relevance of
the documents to the investigation.
Courts have taken the novel approach of requiring the American
269 Undoubtedly, the Department of Justice wants to send a message that there is no such
thing as a "secret" bank account. The question, though, is whether the message would be any less
clear if it were equally well publicized that foreign countries would cooperate with criminal investi-
gations in the United States.
270 See Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d at 613; In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at
498.
271 But see Bank of Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1391:
The Judicial assistance procedure does not afford due deference to the United States' inter-
ests. In essence, the Bank asks the court to require the Courts of the Bahamas to be al-
lowed to do something unlawful under United States law. We conclude such a procedure
to be contrary to the interests of our nation and outweigh the interests of the Bahamas.
272 See id.
273 Cf. Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d at 613: "[W]e also have an obligation
to respect the laws of other sovereign states even though they may differ in economic and legal
philosophy from our own." (emphasis added); Bank of Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1388: "This court
is cognizant that international friction has been provoked by enforcement of subpoenas such as the
one in question."
274 Field, 532 F.2d at 410.
275 The concerns expressed by the Eleventh Circuit in Bank of Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1388,
were centered on eroding the useful and necessary grand jury process with preliminary showings and
"mini-trials." But given the friction caused and the limited number of these cases, an exception to
the general rule would be appropriate. The showing of relevance could be in camera and exparte, as
it is when documents are claimed to be within the attorney/client privilege, in order to protect the
secrecy of the proceedings and the identity of the targets of the investigation. This was a concern of
the court in Bank of Nova Scotia II, 740 F.2d at 829.
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depositor to consent to the disclosure of the information in foreign ac-
counts, relieving the foreign entities of the potential conflict.27 6 Such
compelled consents have been held to be outside the scope of fifth amend-
ment protection, or else the defendant has been protected from self-in-
crimination by an order prohibiting use of the consent as any type of
admission by the defendant. 77
Finally, American courts could stay sanctions278 to permit the for-
eign party to seek relief from the inconsistent commands in its own coun-
try. Foreign courts are likely to be as reluctant as our own to grant relief
before there is a "real and substantial" danger of punishment of the party
by the United States. A stay could be conditioned upon expeditious
prosecution of an action seeking permission to disclose the subpoenaed
information. A decision from the foreign authority on this point when its
national faces serious consequences 279 would allow both sovereigns to ap-
ply the principle of international comity to a live dispute, and would give
American courts a much better perspective on the extent of the foreign
nation's interest in its secrecy laws.
All these alternatives focus on the courts exercising their coercive
powers against their own citizens and residents first in order to assist the
grand jury process. To paraphrase the Eleventh Circuit, it is incongru-
ous to suggest that a U.S. court can compel from a foreign entity what it
cannot compel from its own citizens simply because it is a foreign
entity.2 8
0
V. CONCLUSION
The decisions in the "hard cases," Application of Chase Manhattan
Bank, Field, Bank of Nova Scotia I, and In re Sealed Case, cannot be
explained except as necessary exercises in conflict resolution. In Applica-
276 See United States v. Lehder, 827 F.2d 682 (1 lth Cir. 1987); United States. v. Ghidoni, 732
F.2d 814 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1984); United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025 (2d
Cir. 1985); United States v. Browne, 624 F. Supp. 245 (N.D.N.Y. 1985). But see In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 814 F.2d 791 (1st Cir. 1987). The decision in Davis also notes that the United States
obtained Swiss bank records in that fraud prosecution pursuant to the Treaty Between the United
States and Switzerland for Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 2019,
T.I.A.S. No. 8302.
277 See cases cited supra note 275.
278 See, e.g., Field, 532 F.2d at 404; In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 494.
279 In Bank of Nova Scotia I, 740 F.2d 817, the Cayman courts did not provide relief where
both applications were filed before the sanctions began. After the sanctions were enforced, however,
and the bank still refused to comply in favor of obeying Cayman law, the Governor of the Cayman
Islands authorized the release of the documents, limiting the sanctions on the bank to S 100,000 for
this portion of the case. Id. at 821 n.5.
280 Bank of Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1391: "It is incongruous to suggest that a United States
Court afford greater protection to the customer's right of privacy than would a Bahamian court
simply because this is a foreign tribunal."
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tion of Chase Manhattan Bank, and in the bank's appeal in In re Sealed
Case, primacy was given to the principle that U.S. courts ought not com-
pel violation of civilized foreign laws. In the other cases, enforcement of
U.S. criminal statutes were the primary concern.
Stripped of nice legal distinctions, the individual witnesses in Field
and In re Sealed Case were compelled by U.S. courts to commit crimes
against countries in which they had substantial interests and relation-
ships. Can it be that the United States cannot compel a witness to detail
past acts, but can compel him to commit a "verbal act" crime?
Strangely, the closest purely domestic analogy to bank secrecy is
grand jury secrecy.281 If a state court were to subpoena a federal prose-
cutor to testify in violation of Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, can there be any doubt that the proceeding would be stopped,
even though the prosecutor would not be relating details of past crimes?
Similarly, would not the federal courts be sorely offended if a foreign
nation were to compel disclosure of grand jury proceedings in violation
of a rule of court, not even a statute of the nation, because that rule itself
permitted disclosure to appropriate authorities in the United States?282
Yet, that is the basis upon which the Eleventh Circuit has consistently
rested its decisions to compel violation of foreign laws.2" 3
Finally, is it any answer, from the courts of a nation that has recog-
nized a right to travel as a significant aspect of personal liberty,284 to tell
a witness that he may avoid accountability for his criminal act simply by
never traveling to a country in which he has significant family and prop-
erty interests, particularly when the criminal act is being compelled by
threat of imprisonment in this country for up to a year and a half ?285
If the highest principle of criminal procedure in the United States
were the rooting out and prosecution of crime, then entering contempt
orders in all cases such as these would be not only appropriate, but una-
voidable.286 That is not the highest principle of criminal procedure in
this country, though, as each of the cases discussed demonstrates, not in
their conclusions, but in their tacit recognition that it is necessary that
they at least consider interests other than criminal prosecution.
Moreover, even above consideration of international interests,
comes consideration of the interest of the individual. There is no dispute
in the courts of the United States that a properly invoked privilege makes
the information unavailable to federal invesigators, no matter how signif-
281 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
282 FED. IL CRIM. P. 6(e). See also United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025.
283 See Field, 532 F.2d at 408; Bank of Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1391.
284 See, eg., Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170 (1978), and cases cited therein.
285 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1970).
286 Cf In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d at 499.
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icant the information or the investigation may be.28 7
Those compelled to appear for investigations implicating foreign se-
crecy laws ought to be entitled to the same consideration given witnesses
in purely domestic inquiries. If an applicable privilege is properly in-
voked, the inquiry should cease, without penalty to the witness invoking
the privilege. It ought not matter that the privilege arises from the U.S.
Constitution, a U.S. statute, common law, or a foreign statute which
binds the witness.
The courts have steadfastly resisted novel privileges, for each new
privilege is a potential barrier to significant evidence of serious criminal
conduct.2 88 Those who conduct their daily lives in a particular forum are
aware of the rules governing that conduct and are bound to obey them
and order their affairs accordingly. But those who regularly live by a
different set of sovereign commands ought not be subject to punishment
because they find themselves momentarily within the authority of a dif-
ferent state. As the court observed in In re Sealed Case, "[t]he [govern-
ment] may be able to devise alternative means of addressing this
problem, but the bank [or individual] cannot. 2 9
This is not to say that every incantation of "foreign secrecy" should
repel the federal investigator. On the contrary, it is entirely appropriate
that the investigator press hard, and that the courts subject the claim of
privilege to close scrutiny, just as they do with a claim of a domestic
privilege.
If conflict cannot be avoided between investigator and foreign
banker, then in the United States, the conflict ought to be resolved in
favor of the good faith invocation of an applicable privilege.
287 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
288 See id.
289 825 F.2d at 498.
Vol. 20:509
